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NOTE

COURT PICKS NEW TEST IN COTTON PETROLEUM

In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico' the Supreme Court affirmed
New Mexico's right -to impose a severance tax on oil and gas produced
by non-Indian lessees on the Jicarilla Apache reservation even though

that same production is subject to tribal severance taxes. The Court found
that the taxes were not pre-empted by federal law because there was

neither express nor implied congressional intent to ban state taxation. The
Court further relied on the fact that federal regulation of the production
of the oil and gas was not exclusive, and also noted that New Mexico's
taxes had not placed a "substantial" burden on the tribe, which could
have resulted in a finding of federal pre-emption.
Cotton Petroleum (Cotton), a non-Indian corporation, produces oil and
gas on tribal trust land leased from the Jicarilla Apache Tribe (Tribe).
The Tribe receives taxes that equal approximately six percent of its production. 2 Cotton also pays to New Mexico oil and gas production taxes
equal to approximately eight percent of its production. 3 The Corporation
therefore pays approximately 14 percent of its production value in taxes
to tribal and state governments.
In 1982, Cotton sought relief from its tax burden in New Mexico
District Court.' It argued that the state taxes were invalid under the
Commerce Clause because the amount of taxes paid greatly exceeded the
value of services provided to Cotton by the state.'
The Tribe, which filed an amicus brief, argued that state taxation
substantially interfered with tribal tax-raising ability.6 In addition, the
I. 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989); Cotton Petroleum v. State, 106 N.M. 517, 754 P.2d 1170 (Ct. App.
1987), cert. quashed 106 N.M. 511, 745 P.2d 1159 (1987), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 485 U.S. 1005 (1988), aff'd., 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989).
2. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 106 N.M. 517, 518, 745 P.2d 1170, 1171 (Ct. App. 1987).
3. Id. at 518, n. 1,745 P.2d at 1171, n. 1.
4. Id. at 518-19, 745 P.2d at 1171-72. The company brought suit in New Mexico district court
to obtain a refund of taxes it had paid under protest, and also sought declaratory and injunctive
relief. Cotton also filed a second action, seeking a refund of taxes paid prior to the filing of the
protest. The two actions were consolidated and the Tribe moved and was granted leave to file an
amicus brief. (Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico is a sequel to Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), in which the Court held that the Tribe had the power to impose a
severance tax on oil and gas production by non-Indian lessees on the reservation. Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989)).
5. Cotton Petroleum v. State, at 520, 745 P.2d at 1173.
6. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 . Ct. 1698, 1704 (1989)(citing Trial Record at
124).
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Tribe pointed to New Mexico's failure to "provide services commensurate
with taxes collected." ' Because taxation of on-reservation oil and gas
production by non-Indian lessees would reduce the desirability of the
Tribe's leases, state taxation would weaken the Tribe's economic development contrary to federal policy.
The trial court upheld the state taxes and concluded that the theory of
public finance does not require that taxes paid should equal services
rendered.' The court also found that the economic and legal consequences
of the tax affected only Cotton, and had no adverse impact on tribal
interests.' Finally, the court ruled that the taxes were not pre-empted by
federal law because Cotton failed to establish that the taxes imposed by
the state had an adverse impact on tribal economic development."
Cotton appealed the decision to the New Mexico State Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court." After the New Mexico Supreme
Court quashed cert., " the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which
noted probable jurisdiction. 3
By holding that the taxes are not pre-empted by federal law, the Supreme Court has rejected its own historical approach to Indian pre-emption
cases, and has reversed the presumption which operates when states try
to assert authority over Indian tribes. This article will explore the analytical approach the Court used in deciding Cotton, and will compare that
approach with the historically accepted analysis previously used by the
Court.
BACKGROUND
General Federal Pre-emption Analysis
The Supreme Court in Cotton found that New Mexico's taxes were
not pre-empted by federal law because Congress had neither expressly
nor impliedly acted to pre-empt the taxes. The doctrine of federal preemption arises from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 4 which
acts to pre-empt state law when it conflicts with federal law. Pre-emption
occurs when Congress has specifically prohibited state legislative action
in a particular area, or when Congress has occupied a field so extensively
that state legislation, by implication, may not stand.
In deciding pre-emption cases, the Court has developed standards to
7. Id.

8. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 106 N.M. 517, 519, 745 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Ct. App. 1987).
9. Id.
10. Id.
It. Id. at 517, 745 P.2d at t170.
12. Cotton Petroleum v. State, cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 511, 745 P.2d 1159 (1987).

13. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 485 U.S. 1005 (1988).
14. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2.

Fall 19901

COTTON PETROLEUM CORP. V. NEW MEXICO

discover congressional intent in enacting particular legislation and to
determine if federal legislation pervasively pre-empts state action on the
same subject.
Early decisions' 5 established various tests designed to find congressional intent. These tests, which were later articulated in Pennsylvania
v. Nelson, 6 were applied to determine whether federal regulation was so
pervasive that it was reasonable to assume that Congress intended that
the states could not supplement it. The Court could find that federal
statutes concerning a dominant national interest precluded application of
state law. Or the Court might decide that enforcement of a state law would
conflict with federal administration of a program."
In more recent decisions, the Supreme Court has adopted a strict approach to the application of the pre-emption doctrine. The Court has been
"reluctant" to infer pre-emption,"8 and has required that congressional
intent to pre-empt the field be clear, 9 either from the language of the
statute, or from the extensiveness of the federal regulations,2' the need
for uniformity,2 or the danger of conflict between state law and the federal
regulatory scheme.22 Consequently, absent a finding of congressional intent to pre-empt a particular area from state action, the Court will allow
state legislation to stand.
Indian Law and Pre-emption.
The analysis of pre-emption in the area of Indian law is different.
Because Congress has extensive power over Indian tribes,23 decisions
begin with a presumption of an almost exclusive federal occupation of
the field.24

Federal acts which result in pre-emption in the Indian context can be
extremely general. Pre-emption may be implied from treaties setting aside
land for a reservation even if the treaties contain no specific pre-emption
language.25 Pre-emption has also been established by statutes which reg15. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-74 (1941); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218,
230-31 (1947).
16. 350 U.S. 497 (1955).
17. Id. at 502-10.
18. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978).
19. New York State Dept. of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405, 413 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202, 203 (1952)).
20. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145-53 (1980).
21. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
22. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541-46(1976).
23. Lonewolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
24. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973); Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 221 (1959).
25. See Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n., 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
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ulate trade with Indians, 26 and from statutes which encourage Indians to
establish and strengthen tribal governments.'
The basic difference between general federal pre-emption and preemption in Indian country is the starting point of the analysis. General
pre-emption assumes state intervention unless congressional intent to preempt is established. Indian pre-emption, on the other hand, reverses the
presumption: federal pre-emption exists unless the Court finds congressional intent to allow state intervention. 28
The difference in the two approaches is illustrated by the application
of state laws regulating wildlife. State wildlife laws generally apply to
federal lands, except where they conflict with federal laws. 9 In contrast,
courts have consistently found that states may not regulate wildlife within
Indian reservations without clear congressional language allowing such
action."
Taxation cases also demonstrate the different application of the two
pre-emption doctrines. The Court has typically evaluated state taxation
on federal functions by looking at the taxes' nondiscriminatory nature,
or at the "legal incidence" of the tax involved." However, in Indian
taxation cases, the court has held that state taxes are generally inapplicable
to activities within the reservation, unless Congress has otherwise provided.32 In fact, a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme covering the
tribal activity has been held sufficient to establish federal pre-emption."
Therefore, while there is no general federal pre-emption without express or implied congressional intent, in Indian law this presumption is
reversed: federal pre-emption exists unless the Court finds congressional
intent to allow state intervention.
Finding Congressional Intent
To determine whether congressional intent to allow a state to tax on
the reservation exists, courts must examine legislative history and purpose. The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA)"4 and the Indian
26. See Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 448 U.S. 160 (1980); Warren Trading
Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n., 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
27. See Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 387 (1976); 28 F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal
Indian Law 272-79 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980).
29. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541-47 (1977).
30. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); United States v. County of
Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977); Leech Lake Band of Chippawa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001
(D. Mn. 1971).
31. United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 462-64 (1977).
32. Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832
(1982); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164 (1972).
33. Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458 U.S. 832, 845-47; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136, 145-49 (1980).
34. 25 U.S.C. § 396a-q (1988).
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Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA)35 are the two statutes which were
examined by the Court in Cotton to determine legislative intent.
The IRA was passed "to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to
give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of
oppression and paternalism." 36 This broad legislation signaled a new
approach on the part of the government to Indians and Indian self-sufficiency. The legislation was passed after years of assimilationist policies
which had undercut historical tribal land bases, and had prevented the
development of strong tribal self-government.
The IMLA, passed four years later, was developed to bring pre-1934
Indian mineral leasing statutes in line with the policies underpinning the
IRA." Because the pre-1934 statutes were not "adequate to give the
Indians the greatest return from their property," 3 the IMLA was designed
to help Indians maximize their economic gain from mineral leases.
The statutes that controlled prior to the passage of the IMLA contained
provisions for the states to tax mineral production by non-Indian lessees
on Indian reservations. For example, the Indian Oil Act of 1927"9 expressly waived immunity from state taxation, and the Court determined
that under this act, Montana could tax oil and gas production by lessees.'
However, this statute, and others passed before it, were enacted when
the federal approach to the status of Indians was very different from the
approach after the passage of the IRA.
Prior to 1934, federal policy was designed to achieve full assimilation
of Indians into society, under the complete jurisdiction of the states.4'
The states had a strong interest in the oil and gas reserves within reservations and clearly wanted the right to tax their production. The statutes
prior to 1934 can be viewed as a compromise between competing state
and Indian interests, with the states authorized to tax, while the tribes
were allowed to maintain their reserved rights to the minerals, oil, and
gas within their reservations.
Passage of the IRA, however, dramatically changed the political climate. The goal of assimilation was discarded in favor of Indian selfgovernment and economic development. The IMLA, in turn, continued
the policies developed by the IRA. Because the pre-1934 statutes were
42
not "adequate to give the Indians the greatest return from their property,"
the IMLA was designed to help Indians maximize their economic gain
35.
36.
37.
38.
39,
40.
41.
42.

25 U.S.C. §461-79 (1988).
H.R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934).
S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1937).
Id. at 2.
25 U.S.C. §398c (1988).
British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Bd. of Equalization of Montana, 299 U.S. 159 (1936).
F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 127-41 (1982 ed.).
S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1937).
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from mineral leases. The IMLA contains no express provision for taxation
by the states, and it has a general repealer clause which states 4"[all]
3
[Acts] or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed."
Two more recent federal acts reaffirm the federal policy of encouraging
Indian self-determination and economic development. The Indian Financing Act of 1974 (IFA) 4 contains a declaration of congressional policy
to "help develop and utilize Indian resources . . . to a point where the
Indians will fully exercise responsibiity for the utilization and management of their own resources.
... 4'
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975
(ISEA)' also exemplifies the federal policy encouraging Indian economic
development. The legislation declares federal policy to be provision of
quality educational services to Indian children so that they may "achieve
the measure of self-determination essential to their social and economic
well-being. ,47
In 1983, President Reagan reaffirmed the policies of Indian economic
development mandated by the legislation of the 1970s. Reagan pledged
to "assist tribes in strengthening their governments by removing federal
impediments to tribal self-government and tribal resource development. ""4
The legislation and policy statements clearly establish the broad federal
policy encouraging tribal economic development and self-determination.
It is apparent that since 1934 the federal government has mandated a
strong economic development approach to Indian affairs. This policy
forms a backdrop for court decisions regarding taxation and regulation
within a reservation. Courts have had to balance the analysis of preemption against this backdrop of economic and governmental tribal selfdetermination.
Tribal Sovereignty as a Backdrop
The status of Indian tribes as distinct sovereign entities generally means
that state law cannot penetrate reservation boundaries. 9 However, this
doctrine of sovereignty has been slowly eroded by the Court' and federal
legislation.'
43. 25 U.S.C. §396a (1988).
44. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1534 (1988).
45. Id. at § 145 1.
46. 25 U.S.C. §§450-450n (1988).
47. Id. at §450a(c).
48. Indian Policy Statement, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 98, 99 (Jan. 24, 1983).
49. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
50. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136 (1980): McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
51. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat 588 (1953), (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)) (federal law granting several states full civil and criminal jurisdiction over
specific Indian reservations).
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The modem approach to the use of tribal sovereignty as a bar to state
jurisdiction emanates from Williams v. Lee:52 "Absent governing Acts of
Congress, the question [is) whether the state action infringe[s] on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them." 53 A finding of either infringement or pre-emption barred the state's
action ."
Recently, the Court has shifted away from Indian sovereignty as a bar
to state jurisdiction, and instead, has used it primarily as a backdrop to
pre-emption analysis.55 At the same time, the Court has begun to balance
the state's interests against federal and tribal interests."6 Despite the weakened use of tribal sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction, however, the
Court has continued to acknowledge tribal sovereignty as a factor when
applying the pre-emption test.5"
ANALYSIS
The decision in Cotton included both a consideration of tribal sovereignty and an examination of relevant statutes to determine congressional
intent. However, the majority failed to apply the presumption traditionally
applied in Indian law cases, that is, a presumption of federal pre-emption
absent clear congressional intent to allow state regulatory activity. In
Cotton the Court applied the general pre-emption approach: absent
congressional intent to pre-empt state activity, the state regulation may
stand.
Finding Congressional Intent
Cotton and the Tribe argued that federal laws and policies promoting
tribal economic development indicate federal intent to insure that Indian
tribes realize the maximum benefit from their oil and gas leases. They
argued that New Mexico taxes were pre-empted" by federal legislation
and policies "which support the maximization of tribal revenues and the
strengthening of tribal government. "59 Cotton and the Tribe contended
that any attempt by the state to tax the production by the lessees necessarily
52. 358 U.S. 217 (1959)(Arizona has no jurisdiction over a civil action by non-Indian against
Indian for price of goods sold on the reservation).
53. Id. at 220.
54. Id.
55. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
56. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720-25 (1983).
57. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
58. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S.Ct. 1698, 1707 n.ll (1989). The Supreme
Court concluded the pre-emption argument was properly before the Court even though Cotton did
issue before the New Mexico Court of Appeals. The Court concluded that because the
not raise this
court of appeals was fully briefed on this issue by the Tribe as an amicus curiae, and had fully
considered and passed on the pre-emption issue, the matter was properly before the Court. Id.
59. Brief Amici Curiae of Crow Tribe et al. at 25, Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109
S.Ct. 1698 (1989) (No.87-1327).
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reduces the desirability of the tribal leases, and potentially undercuts the
tribal economy, because these leases represent the major source of tribal
revenues. 60
In spite of the language and the legislative intent embodied in legislative
acts of the past 50 years, the majority in Cotton refused to find implicit
congressional intent barring state taxation. In so doing the Court ignored
a standard canon of construction in Indian law: "statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit." 6'
More importantly, the majority failed to apply the standard Indian preemption principles. The Court should have started with a presumption of
pre-emption based on the pervasive regulatory scheme and searched for
express congressional intent waiving immunity from taxation. Instead the
Court presumed the applicability of state taxes in the absence of express
congressional intent barring taxation.
Balancing of Federal state and Tribal Interests
Even though the Court rejected the Tribe's argument regarding congressional intent, the Court could have found that the taxes were pre-empted
by the established Indian pre-emption analysis. "This inquiry . . .[calls]
for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal and tribal
interests at stake ...."" The federal and tribal interests arise from broad
congressional power to regulate Indian affairs under the Indian Commerce
Clause,63 and from the sovereign status of tribes. "These interests tend
to erect two 'independent but related' barriers to the exercise of state
authority over commercial activity on an Indian reservation. .. .
Generally, the exercise of state authority is impermissible where there
is federal pre-emption as shown by an extensive regulatory scheme which
leaves no room for the exercise of state authority, 65 or where state authority
infringes on the right of Indians to "make their own laws and be ruled
by them."' This analysis requires a balancing of the various interests of
each entity. For example, a state's regulatory interest will be given more
60. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S.Ct. 1698, 1725 (1989) (Blackmun, J.
dissenting) (90 percent of tribal income comes from oil and gas royalties).
61. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); see also McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
62. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
63. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl.
3.
64. Ramah Navajo School Board Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 837
(1982) (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v.Bracket, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980)).
65. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980); Warren Trading Post
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n., 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965).
66. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 142 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
220 (1959)).
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weight if the state can show off-reservation effects that compel state
intervention.67
The exercise of state authority which burdens tribal revenues must be
justified by state services rendered in connection with the on-reservation
activity." Therefore, when a state seeks to impose a tax on a transaction
between a tribe and non-Indians, the state must illustrate more than a
general interest in raising revenues. 69
In this case, the majority found that New Mexico provided services to
the Tribe and to Cotton that justified its imposition of taxes. The majority
also found that the federal regulatory scheme was not exclusive, because
New Mexico had imposed state regulations as well. 7"
Although the majority stated it was applying a "flexible" approach in
its pre-emption analysis, the Court has, in fact, imposed a rigid standard
on the Tribe. Distinguishing Cotton from other cases in which pre-emption
was found, the majority points to services provided by the state, the fact
that the economic burden of the taxes falls on the lessees, and the state
regulation of the oil fields as justification for the taxes imposed. The
Court appears to hold that if a state provides some services, 7 sufficient
justification for taxation exists, especially if the economic burden of the
taxes does not fall directly on the Tribe. Yet with a flexible approach,
the Court would balance the nature and extent of the services provided
by the state against the underlying federal policies promoting Indian
economic development and tribal self-government. The same approach
is seen with the concept of federal regulation. State regulation of the onreservation production of oil and gas is minimal,72 and must be approved
by the Bureau of Land Management prior to its application." The Court
found that this minimal regulation, along with the state services and the
fact that the economic burden of the taxes does not fall directly on the
Tribe, was sufficient to reject a finding of federal pre-emption.
The Court has now established a standard which will be extremely
difficult to meet. It suggests that in the absence of affirmative congres67. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983).
68. Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832,
843 (1982).
69. Id. at 845. See also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 150 (1980);
Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965).
70. Oil-and-gas-related revenues expended by the state for the Tribe over the 5-year period
contested were $89,384, compared to $1,206,800 in federal funds and $736,358 in tribal funds.
Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698, 1724 (1989) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citing
Brief for Jicarilla Apache Tribe as Amicus Curiae 10-11, n.8).
71. New Mexico regulates the spacing and the mechanical integrity of the wells. Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698, 1714-15 (1989) (citing New Mexico district court finding
App. to Juris statement 16).
72. Id.
73. 43 C.F.R. §§3162 3-1(a) and (b) (1987).
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sional intent to pre-empt, pre-emption will depend on findings that the
economic burden of the tax falls directly on the tribe, and that the state
provides neither services nor regulates the particular cactivity taxed.
This standard was not imposed in earlier decisions. The standard had
previously required a finding of comprehensive federal regulation, not
exclusive federal regulation.74 The approach taken by the Court in Cotton
undermines the clear federal policy promoting Indian self-sufficiency through
economic development.
CONCLUSION
The majority in Cotton has made it more difficult for Indians to develop
tribal economic resources. While the decision was an expedient solution
for a state that is extremely dependent upon revenues produced by taxation
of oil and gas production, the short-term benefits will not out-weigh the
long-term detrimental effect on Indian tribes. The Court has chipped away
at traditional notions of tribal sovereignty and Indian pre-emption analysis, leaving the Tribes poorer both economically and in terms of inherent
power.
KRISTINA BOGARDUS

74. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980).

